Bio
Professor William Wang has taught courses in Corporations and Corporate Finance. From January 2005 through January 2009, Professor Wang served as a member of the FINRA (formerly NASD) National Adjudicatory Council. In addition, from 1996 to 2011 he chaired the Investment Policy Oversight Group of the Law School ¾«¶«Ó°Òµ Council and served ex officio on the LSAC board. Since 2012, he has been on the board of directors of Access Group Inc. and on its investment committee.
Professor Wang was born in New York City and grew up near Washington, D.C. He is a Phi Beta Kappa graduate of Amherst College, and he is an honorary Woodrow Wilson Fellow. He received his law degree from Yale Law School. After graduating from Yale, Professor Wang took the California Bar Examination and then moved to New York to work for a firm engaging in risk arbitrage. He left Wall Street to teach at the ¾«¶«Ó°Òµ of San Diego Law School. He later served briefly as a full-time consultant to the White House Domestic Policy Staff. He joined the UC Law SF faculty in 1981.
In addition to UC Law SF and the ¾«¶«Ó°Òµ of San Diego, he has taught at the law schools of NYU, New York Law School, Leiden ¾«¶«Ó°Òµ (Netherlands), Brooklyn Law School, Villanova ¾«¶«Ó°Òµ, UCLA, and U.C. Davis.
Professor Wang is the coauthor of a treatise, Insider Trading, now in its third edition. He has also written numerous articles in law journals, magazines, and newspapers on subjects ranging from The Unbundling of Higher Education to novel investment strategies with Toilet Paper – It’s Good As Gold or How to ‘Clean Up’ in Toilet Paper.
As a hobby, Professor Wang likes to give travel, consumer, and investment tips. He has also published an article on budget travel to Las Vegas.
Scholarship
Books
Ìý(Oxford Univ. Press 3d ed. 2010) (with Marc I. Steinberg).
Ìý(Practising Law Institute 2d ed. 2005 & Supps. 2005-2008) (with Marc I. Steinberg).
Ìý(Little, Brown 1996 & Supps. 1998–2002) (with Marc I. Steinberg).
Journal Articles
A Roth Conversion Is Not Necessarily More Attractive During a Significant Stock Market Decline: Separating the Tax and Market Timing Effects, 50ÌýTax Mgmt. Compensation Plan. J.Ìý10 (2022).Ìý
The Proposed Secure Act’s Ten-Year Mandatory Distribution Period for Non-Spousal Traditional §401(k)/IRA Beneficiaries May Not Increase Government Revenue, 47ÌýTax Mgmt. Compensation Plan. J.Ìý12 (2019) (reprinted inÌýINSIGHT: SECURE Act May Not Increase Government Revenue,Ìý246 BNA Daily Tax Report 9, Dec. 24, 2019).Ìý
Application of the Federal Mail and Wire Fraud Statutes to Criminal Liability for Stock Market Insider Trading and Tipping, 70ÌýU. Miami L. Rev.Ìý220 (2015).ÌýÌý
The Importance of “The Law of Conservation of Securities”: A Reply to John P. Anderson’s “What’s the Harm in Issuer-Licensed Insider Trading?”, 69ÌýU. Miami L. Rev.Ìý811 (2015).ÌýÌý
An Introduction to United States Securities and Exchange Commission Rule 10b-5, 27ÌýNihon Univ. Comp. L.Ìý105 (2010).Ìý
Measuring Insider Trading Damages for a Private Plaintiff, 10ÌýU.C. Davis Bus. L.J.Ìý1 (2009).ÌýÌý
The United States Law on Stock Market Insider Trading and Tipping, 26ÌýNihon Univ. Comp. L.Ìý107 (2009).Ìý
The Restructuring of Legal Education Along Functional Lines, 17ÌýJ. Contemp. Legal IssuesÌý331 (2008).ÌýÌý
Who Are the Victims of Stock Market Insider Trading? Is Stock Market Insider Trading Fraud?, 25ÌýNihon Univ. Comp. L.Ìý45 (2008).Ìý
The Injustice of Reducing the Number of Levels in a Grading System, 57ÌýJ. Legal Educ.Ìý423 (2007).Ìý
The Corporation as Insider Trader, 30ÌýDel. J. Corp. L.Ìý45 (2005) (with Mark J. Loewenstein) (reprinted inÌý35ÌýBank & Corp. Governance L. Rep.Ìý425 (2005)).ÌýÌý
Apply UBIT to De Facto Leverage, But Not to ‘Spurious Leverage’, 95ÌýTax NotesÌý925 (May 6, 2002) (reprinted inÌý37ÌýExempt Org. Tax Rev.Ìý27 (2002)).
Selective Disclosure by Issuers, Its Legality and Ex Ante Harm: Some Observations in Response to Professor Fox, 42ÌýVa. J. Int’l L.Ìý869 (2002) (adapted and reprinted inÌý24ÌýCompany Law.Ìý144 (2003)).ÌýÌý
The Supreme Court’s Misplaced Concern with Selective Fairness:ÌýBush v. GoreÌýand Three Analogies to Grading Dilemmas, 52ÌýJ. Legal Educ.Ìý272 (2002).Ìý
Stock Market Insider Trading: Victims, Violators and Remedies—Including an Analogy to Fraud in the Sale of a Used Car with a Generic Defect, 45ÌýVill. L. Rev.Ìý27 (2000) (reprinted inÌý33ÌýSec. L. Rev.Ìý381 (2001), 3ÌýInt’l & Comp. L. Rev.Ìý77 (2000),Ìýand in part inÌýDonna M. Nagy, Richard W. Painter & Margaret V. Sachs, Securities Litigation and Enforcement: Cases and MaterialsÌý595 (3d ed. 2012)).ÌýÌý
A Qualitative Theory of the Dead Hand, 68ÌýInd. L.J.Ìý1 (1992) (with Adam J. Hirsch).Ìý
ITSFEA’s Effect on Either an Implied Cause of Action for Damages by Contemporaneous Traders or an Action for Damages or Rescission by the Party in Privity with the Inside Trader, 16ÌýJ. Corp. L.Ìý445 (1991) (reprinted inÌý25ÌýSec. L. Rev.Ìý427 (D. Langevoort ed., 1993)).Ìý
More Thoughts onÌýLitwin v. Allen, 9ÌýThe Red HerringÌý3 (Fall 1989).
A Cause of Action for Option Traders Against Insider Option Traders, 101ÌýHarv. L. Rev.Ìý1056 (1988) (reprinted inÌýMaterials on the Law of Insider TradingÌý384 (C. E. Fletcher ed., 1991)).Ìý
Is a Seller’s Rule 10b–5 Cause of Action Automatically Transferred to the Buyer?, 1988ÌýColum. Bus. L. Rev.Ìý129 (1988) (reprinted inÌý33ÌýCorp. Prac. Comm.Ìý41 (1991)).Ìý
Some Thoughts onÌýLitwin v. Allen, 8ÌýThe Red HerringÌý3 (Fall 1988).
The “Contemporaneous” Traders Who Can Sue an Inside Trader, 38ÌýHastings L.J.Ìý1175 (1987) (reprinted in part inÌýMaterials on the Law of Insider TradingÌý371 (C. E. Fletcher ed., 1991)).Ìý
Some Arguments That the Stock Market is Not Efficient, 19ÌýU.C. Davis L. Rev.Ìý341 (1986).Ìý
Natural Advantages and Contractual Justice, 3ÌýLaw & Phil.Ìý281 (1984) (with Larry Alexander) (reprinted inÌý2ÌýContract LawÌý453 (International Library of Essays in Law & Legal Theory 1991)).
Recent Developments in the Federal Law Regulating Stock Market Inside Trading, 6ÌýCorp. L. Rev.Ìý291 (1983) (reprinted inÌý16ÌýSec. L. Rev.Ìý219 (1984),Ìýand reprinted in slightly different form inÌýContemporary Issues in Securities RegulationÌý59 (M. Steinberg ed., 1987)).
±Ê´Ç²õ³Ù–ChiarellaÌýDevelopments in Rule 10b–5, 15ÌýRev. Sec. Reg.Ìý956 (1982).
Reflections on Contract Law and Distributive Justice: A Reply to Kronman, 34ÌýHastings L.J.Ìý513 (1982).Ìý
The Advantage of Paying Your Bar Dues Early, 4ÌýBottom LineÌý126 (Nov. 1982).
The Dismantling of Higher Education Part 1, 29ÌýImproving Coll. & Univ. TeachingÌý55 (1981).Ìý
The Dismantling of Higher Education Part 2, 29ÌýImproving Coll. & Univ. TeachingÌý155 (1981).Ìý
Trading on Material Non-Public Information on Impersonal Stock Markets: Who is Harmed, and Who can Sue Whom Under SEC Rule 10b-5?, 54ÌýS. Cal. L. Rev.Ìý1217 (1981) (reprinted in part inÌýMaterials on the Law of Insider TradingÌý575 (C. E. Fletcher ed., 1991)).Ìý
Reflections on Convenience Translations: A Reply to Professor Brooks, 17ÌýSan Diego L. Rev.Ìý309 (1980) (reprinted inÌýCorporate Counsel’s AnnualÌý1981, at 1301 (Jeremiah J. Spires & Edward J. Burchell eds., 1981)).Ìý
A Chicken in Every Pot, and Forty-one Channels for Every Television Set, 1ÌýComm. & L.Ìý97 (1979).Ìý
The California Statutory Close Corporation: Gateway to Flexibility or Trap for the Unwary?, 15ÌýSan Diego L. Rev.Ìý687 (1978).Ìý
Pooling Agreements Under the New California General Corporation Law, 23ÌýUCLA L. Rev.Ìý1171 (1976).Ìý
The Metaphysics of Punishment—An Exercise in Futility, 13ÌýSan Diego L. Rev.Ìý306 (1976).Ìý
The Unbundling of Higher Education, 1975ÌýDuke L.J.Ìý53 (1975).Ìý
The Structure of the Securities Market—Past and Future, 41ÌýFordham L. Rev.Ìý1 (1972) (with Thomas A. Russo) (reprinted inÌýN.Y. L.J., Nov. 27, 1972, at 1).Ìý
Newspaper & Magazine Articles
Similarities Between Roth IRAs And Non-Dividend Paying Stocks,ÌýFin. Advisor, Apr. 25, 2023.Ìý
The Long and the Short of Classifying ‘Hedged Equity’ Funds,ÌýPensions & Inv., Feb. 18, 2022.Ìý
Insight: Myths About the Traditional and Roth 401(k)/IRA That Affect How People Use Them,ÌýBNA Daily Tax Report, Feb. 3, 2020.Ìý
Insight: Repeal of Retiree Required Minimum Distributions May Increase Government Revenue,ÌýBNA Daily Tax Report, Jan. 9, 2020.Ìý
Insight: Why ‘Risk’ Aversion Should Cause a High Percentage in Stocks,ÌýBNA Daily Tax Report, Mar. 16, 2020.Ìý
Looking Back at the High Court’s Landmark Campaign Finance Decisions,ÌýDaily J., Mar. 1, 2019, at 1.
Paying the Price in a Net-Long Portfolio,ÌýPensions & Inv., Jan. 27, 2017.Ìý
Is It Worthwhile to Realize Capital Gains to Finance the Tax for the Roth Conversion,Ìý34 ABA Section of Taxation News Quarterly, Winter, 2015, at 1.
Advantages of 401(k) Even with No Capital Gains Tax and Same (or Sometimes Higher) Tax Rate at Retirement,ÌýABA Sec. of Tax’n NewsQuarterly, Summer, 2013, at 10.
Index-Fund Outperformance Not Logical in Rational World,ÌýPensions & Inv., Aug. 5, 2013, at 23.Ìý
Using ‘Spurious’ Leverage to Reduce Personal Income Taxes When One Has the Maximum Allowed in an IRA/401(k),ÌýABA Section of Taxation NewsQuarterly, Spring, 2013, at 16.
Passive Investing in Stocks Based on Market Cap,ÌýPensions & Inv., July 26, 2012.Ìý
Some Immediate and Long-Term Advantages of a Roth IRA Conversion,ÌýABA Section Taxation NewsQuarterly, Winter, 2011, at 10.
Hidden Leverage and Portfolio Policies,ÌýPensions & Investments, Dec. 8, 2008, at 28.Ìý
Alternative Treatments of Equitized Hedge Funds,ÌýPensions & Investments, May 1, 2006, at 37.Ìý
Toilet Paper: It’s as Good as Gold,ÌýS.F. Chron., Apr. 26, 1980, at 36 (slightly revised version reprinted as:ÌýAs an Investment, Toilet Paper is as Good as Gold, The Detroit News, Aug. 28, 2013).
Booting the Professors,ÌýWash. Star, Jan. 9, 1978.
A Liberal’s Confession,ÌýN.Y. Times, June 14, 1976, at 31.
Other Publications
Should Part of a 130/30 Fund Count Toward a Portfolio’s Hedge Fund Maximum?,ÌýPensions & Investments OnlineÌý(Jan. 13, 2011).Ìý
When Should a Nonprofit with an Endowment Borrow Long–Term?,ÌýPensions & InvestmentsÌý(Nov. 2009).Ìý
Education
-
Amherst College
B.A., Economics 1967 -
Yale Law School
J.D. 1971
